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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of jury racial composition on trial outcomes using a unique data set
of felony trials in Florida between 2000 and 2010. We utilize a research design that exploits day-to-day
variation in the composition of the jury pool to isolate quasi-random variation in the composition of the
seated jury, finding evidence that: (i) juries formed from all-white jury pools convict black defendants
significantly (16 percentage points) more often than white defendants and (ii) this gap in conviction
rates is entirely eliminated when the jury pool includes at least one black member. The impact of jury
race is much greater than what a simple correlation of the race of the seated jury and conviction rates
would suggest. These findings imply that the application of justice is highly uneven and raise obvious
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1.  Introduction 
  The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes the right of a defendant charged with a 
crime to a trial by an impartial jury.
1 Yet the history of American criminal justice is replete with cases 
where the abstract promise of jury impartiality has been called into question. Of special concern are 
settings where a minority member of a population is tried in a location in which few, if any, members of 
the same minority are likely to serve on the jury.
2 This concern has arisen repeatedly in the context of 
race, as blacks generally constitute a small fraction of the population, and therefore seated juries, in the 
majority of U.S. states and counties. Vastly unequal outcomes – the proportion of blacks in the prison 
population is almost four times that in the general population – along with anecdotal evidence from many 
cases have led numerous observers to question whether the criminal justice system treats black defendants 
(and victims) fairly. 
  Despite the fundamental importance of the equal and impartial application of the law for the 
American criminal justice system, the empirical literature on the effect of jury racial composition on trial 
outcomes is sparse and flawed. Studies based on experimental evidence from “mock” trials are limited by 
numerous  simplifications  made  for  experimental  expediency  and,  more  fundamentally,  by  the 
substantially  lower  stakes  compared  to r e a l  c r i m i n a l  t r i a l s .
3 A n d ,  t h e  f e w  s tudies  that  examine  the 
correlation between the composition of the seated jury and trial outcomes are problematic because the 
seated jury results from a non-random selection process.
4 In particular, in the vast majority of criminal 
trials in the United States, prosecution and defense attorneys are able to exclude a sizeable number of 
potential jurors in the jury pool from the seated jury without explanation through the use of peremptory 
challenges. As a result, even if the initial jury pool is randomly drawn, the composition of the seated jury 
may be correlated with the nature of the charges and evidence in the case as well as the attributes of the 
defendant.  
  Given the limitations of the existing literature, the main goal of this paper is to provide the first 
empirical evidence of the effects of jury composition on trial outcomes based on quasi-random variation 
in jury composition and data from real criminal trials.
5 We do so by combining a unique dataset that 
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1 The 6th Amendment states that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed;” 
2 Sommers and Ellsworth (2003) highlight some of the higher profile cases where there have been questions about 
the role of race in jury decisions.  
3 For instance, mock jurors typically hear a substantially condensed version of a case, i.e. a one-page write-up, do 
not see a “defendant”, and decide the verdict individually rather than coming to a unanimous decision as a group. In 
addition, they are rarely representative of the population and are actually often white college students. 
4 See, for instance, Bowers et al. (2001) study of capital cases and Daudistel et al (1999) study of non-felony cases. 
5!Although literature in this area is sparse, there are many studies in the economics literature that examine the effect 
of race in other areas.  For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) studied disparities in employment; Ross and 
Yinger (2002) in mortgage lending; Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001), Anwar and Fang (2006), and Antonovics ! 2!
provides information on both the seated jury and jury pool for each trial with a novel research design that 
seeks to isolate a random source of variation in jury composition. Our data set consists of all felony trials 
for which jury selection began in Sarasota and Lake Counties, Florida during 5.5- and 10-year periods, 
respectively, in the 2000s. The data are unusually rich in providing information on the age, race, and 
gender not only for each of the 6 – 7 members of the seated jury but also for the approximately 27 
members of the jury pool for the trial from which the seated jury is selected. The data set also contains 
detailed information about the race and gender of the defendant, the criminal charge(s), and the final jury 
verdict.  
  Our research design exploits the variation in the composition of the jury pool across trials, which 
is driven primarily by which eligible jurors in the county are randomly called for jury duty on a given 
day.
6 I n  essence,  we  examine  how  conviction  rates  for  white  and  black  defendants  vary  with  the 
composition of the jury pool rather than the seated jury. The day-to-day variation in the composition of 
the jury pool does in fact appear to be random – the composition of the pool is uncorrelated with the 
characteristics of the defendant and the criminal charges. And, because the eligible jury population in 
both Sarasota and Lake Counties is less than five percent black, much of the variation in the sample is 
between pools in which there are no black potential jurors (36 percent) and those with at least one black 
member (64 percent).  
  The evidence regarding the impact of the jury pool on conviction rates is straightforward and 
striking: the presence of even one or two blacks in the jury pool results in significantly higher conviction 
rates for white defendants and lower conviction rates for black defendants.  Specifically, in cases with no 
blacks in the jury pool, black defendants are convicted at an 81 percent rate and white defendants at a 66 
percent rate. When the jury pool includes at least one black potential juror, conviction rates are almost 
identical:  71 percent for black defendants and 73 percent for white defendants.  The estimated impact of 
the racial composition of the jury pool on trial outcomes is statistically significant and leads to three main 
conclusions: (i) there is a significant gap in conviction rates for black versus white defendants when there 
are  no  blacks  in  the  jury  pool,  (ii)  the  gap  in  conviction  rates  for  black  versus  white  defendants  is 
eliminated when there is at least one black member of the jury pool, and (iii) conviction rates for white 
defendants are significantly higher when there is at least one black member of the jury pool (versus all-
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and Knight (2009) in motor vehicle stops and searches; Ayres and Waldfogel (1994) in bail setting; and Price and 
Wolfers (2010) and Parsons et.al. (2011) in sports refereeing. 
6Though  we  are  not  aware  of  other  studies  that  use  random  variation  in  jury  composition  as  a  source  of 
identification,  there  are  a  handful  of  studies  utilizing  random  variation  in  other  aspects  of  the  criminal  justice 
system. Abrams et al. (2009), for instance, take advantage of the random assignment of cases to judges to study 
whether  there  are  disparities  across  judges  in  the  racial  gap  in  sentencing.  Kling  (2006)  uses  random  judge 
assignment  as  a  source  of  exogenous  variation  in  sentence  length.  Abrams  and  Yoon  (2007)  use  the  random 
assignment of felony cases to public defenders in Las Vegas to study the effect of attorney ability on case outcomes. ! 3!
white jury pools). The estimates are robust to a number of alternative specifications, e.g., the inclusion of 
other case and defendant characteristics interacted with jury race, and the same pattern holds in both Lake 
and Sarasota counties independently.  
Having  established  that  the  racial  composition  of  the  jury  pool  has  a  substantial  impact o n  
conviction  rates,  we consider a  n u mb e r  o f  p o s s i b l e  c h a n n e l s  t h r o u gh  which  random  variation  in  the 
composition of the jury pool might affect trial outcomes. Most obviously and directly, having at least one 
black member in the jury pool makes it fe asible to have a black member on the seat ed jury. Black 
representation on the seated jury might affect trial outcomes not only through the jury deliberation and 
decision process but also by affecting how the case is presented and argued by the prosecution and 
defense attorneys.  
Adding black potential jurors to the pool can also affect trial outcomes even when these jurors are 
not ultimately seated on the jury. This indirect effect comes about through the jury selection process if 
attorneys on each side use their peremptory challenges to strike the potential jurors most likely to be 
hostile to their case. We would expect the defense attorney, for example, to systematically strike those 
jurors with the highest ex ante probabilities of conviction (i.e., those in the upper tail of the distribution) 
based on their observable attributes and answers to pre-trial questioning.  In this way, whenever attorneys 
use peremptory challenges to strike black members of the pool (presumably when they are in the tail of 
the distribution), they forgo the possibility of excluding another potential juror with a similar ex ante 
probability  of  convicting.  This  pulls t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  conviction  for  the  seated  jurors t o w a r d s  t h a t  
excluded person’s position even though he or she does not wind up serving on the jury.  
In addition to illustrating how a member of the jury pool could affect trial outcomes even without 
being seated, this view of the selection process also provides an explanation for another striking fact from 
the data: that black and white potential jurors in the pool are about equally likely to be seated. While 
attorneys may have additional motivations for seating black jurors in proportion to their representation in 
the pool – in particular, it is illegal to consider race when using peremptory challenges –the distributions 
of ex ante likelihoods of conviction for white and black members of the jury pool may naturally overlap 
significantly when there is substantial within-race heterogeneity. Given this heterogeneity, the attorneys 
will effectively seat a significant number of black potential jurors whose ex ante likelihoods of conviction 
are not all that different than those of the seated white jurors. 
That the presence of black members of the jury pool might have a substantial effect on trial 
outcomes even when no black jurors are actually seated for the trial is also consistent with the pattern of 
correlation of the composition of the seated jury with trial outcomes. Strikingly, OLS estimates of the 
black-white conviction rate gap when there is at least one black member of the seated jury, for example, 
are almost identical to the estimated causal effect of having at least one black potential juror in the pool. ! 4!
That these point estimates are similar in magnitude despite the fact that a black juror is seated in only 40 
percent of the cases in which there is a black member of the jury pool implies that jury race has a broader 
impact than what a naïve OLS analysis of the effect of seated jury composition would suggest. That is, 
while the black-white conviction gap declines by an average of 16 percentage points in all trials in which 
there is at least one black member of the jury pool, a naive OLS analysis of the effect of the seated jury 
would instead appear to imply that such a decline occurred only in the smaller subset of cases in which a 
black juror was actually seated.  
We conclude the paper with a discussion of the implications of our findings regarding the fair and 
equal application of the law. Our main findings imply that the application of justice is highly uneven, as 
even small changes in the composition of the jury pool have a large impact on average conviction rates 
for black versus white defendants. They also show that defendants of each race do relatively better when 
the jury pool contains more members of their own race, raising obvious concerns about whether black 
defendants receive a fair trial in jurisdictions with a small proportion of blacks in the jury pool. The 
ability  of o u r  a n a l y s i s  to  draw  firm  conclusions  about  the  fairness  of  trial  outcomes,  however,  is 
fundamentally limited by the fact that the strength of the evidence in cases brought against white and 
black defendants is not observed directly in the data. As a result, it is impossible to draw firm conclusions 
about what relative conviction rates should be for black and white defendants. If, in fact, the strength of 
the evidence in cases involving black and white defendants is comparable, our results would imply that 
juries resulting from all-white jury pools require weaker standards of evidence to convict black versus 
white  defendants,  while  juries  resulting  from  jury  pools  with  at  least  some  black  members  apply 
comparable standards. We discuss how future research could address the vital question of fairness in the 
conclusion of the paper.   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information on 
jury selection in the United States, jury trials in Florida, and relevant literature, while Section 3 describes 
the data. Section 4 presents our main analysis of the impact of jury racial composition on conviction rates 
for  black  and  white  defendants  as  well  as  a  number  of  alternative  specifications  that  establish  the 
robustness of our main findings. Section 5 interprets our findings in the context of a number of additional 
empirical regularities and potential channels through which variation in the jury pool might affect trial 
outcomes.  Section  6 c o n c l u d e s  b y  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  i mp l i c a t i o n s  o f  o u r  f i n d i n g s  f o r  t h e  f a i r  a n d  e q u a l  
application of the law. 
 
2.  The Jury Trial 
Overview of the Jury Selection Process ! 5!
  The  jury  trial  is  a  prominent  part  of  the  U.S.  justice  system.  Hannaford-Agor e t  a l .  ( 2 0 0 7 )  
estimate that there are 154,000 jury trials per year in the U.S., 66 percent of which are criminal trials. 
They also estimate that 32 million people are summoned each year for jury service and that 1.5 million 
jurors are impaneled each year. While many details are determined at the state level, the core elements of 
jury selection are fairly standard across jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction has a master jury list, a list of 
individuals that are considered to be potential jurors.
7 Eligibility criteria for jury service are also fairly 
consistent across states: an individual must be a U.S. citizen, a resident of the geographic jurisdiction 
served by the court, able to speak/understand English, and not under a legal disability (felony conviction 
or incompetence) (Rottman and Strickland, 2006). Individuals from the master jury list are randomly 
selected to receive a summons for jury service, which requests that the individual appear at the courthouse 
on a given date for jury selection (voir dire).  
To give a brief overview of the process, let us suppose that 100 individuals receive a summons to 
appear (and that they actually do appear) on a given day. For simplicity, assume that the jury for just one 
trial is to be chosen. Of the 100 potential jurors, suppose 30 are called into the courtroom to be in the 
venire, i.e. the actual pool of jurors from which the jury is chosen. The prosecutor and defense attorneys 
(or  the  judge,  depending  on  the  state)  then  ask  the  potential  jurors  a  series  of  questions,  which  are 
designed to determine whether the individual is fit to serve as an impartial member of the jury. Some 
individuals are simply excused from service, perhaps because of a medical condition. Other individuals 
are removed for cause by the judge because they cannot be impartial or follow the law; for instance, they 
may have a personal relationship with the defendant or state that they are unwilling to impose a particular 
punishment, like the death penalty. Both prosecutor and defense attorneys can request a removal for 
cause, and there is generally no limit to the amount of such requests.  
   Finally, both the prosecutor and defense attorneys have the option to use peremptory challenges 
to strike potential jurors from the jury. Such challenges are differentiated from removals for cause in that 
the attorneys do not have to state the reason for the strike and there are a limited number of peremptory 
challenges available to both the prosecution and defense.
8 Though the attorneys do not have to provide a 
reason for dismissing a juror, a peremptory challenge cannot be used to strike a juror solely on the basis 
of race or gender.
9, 10 Numerous studies, however, indicate that the use of the peremptory challenge is not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Nineteen states use a combined list of registered voters and licensed drivers (Hannaford-Agor, Mize, and Waters, 
2007). 
8 The number of challenges allocated to both sides depends on the state and type of trial (criminal or civil, felony or 
misdemeanor, capital or non-capital); in some states, the prosecution and defense are allotted different numbers of 
strikes. 
9 The Supreme Court first confronted the issue of race-based peremptory challenges in 1965 in Swain v. Alabama, in 
which they ruled that the "State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as 
jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause". However, the burden of proof on the ! 6!
race neutral; rather, they often find that prosecutors are more likely to strike black venire members and 
defense attorneys are more likely to strike white venire members (Diamond et. al., 2009; Baldus et. al, 
2001; McGonigle, Becka, LaFleur, and Wyatt, 2005; Rose, 1999; Sommers and Norton, 2007; Turner, 
Lovell, Young and Denny, 1986).
11 Though race appears to play a role in both the prosecutor’s and 
defense’s use of peremptory challenges, studies have also shown that these opposing challenges cancel 
each other out, in the sense that there is no overall effect on the racial composition of the jury (Diamond 
et. al., 2009 and Rose, 1999). Importantly, however, even without affecting the number of seated jurors of 
each  race,  the  use  of  peremptory  challenges  may  affect  trial  outcomes  by  altering  the  attributes 
(potentially unobserved in the data) of the seated jurors of each race.  
  Thus, jury selection begins with a large pool (30 individuals in our running example); potential 
jurors are then interviewed in sequence and potentially excused, removed for cause, or struck via the 
peremptory challenge. Those who survive voir dire make up the jury, the size of which depends on the 
jurisdiction and type of trial. Historically, juries were composed of 12 individuals; 12-member juries are 
still used in many states and especially in serious criminal trials. In part to reduce court costs, however, 
many states now use smaller juries (6-8 jurors) for civil trials and less serious criminal trials (Hannaford-
Agor, 2009; Waters, 2004). In addition, one or two alternates are often chosen at this time (through the 
same set of questioning and dismissing procedures). 
 
Jury Trials in Sarasota County and Lake County, Florida 
  In Florida, circuit courts have jurisdiction over felonies, family law matters, civil cases of over 
$15,000, probate/guardianship/mental health, and juvenile dependency and delinquency. County courts 
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defendant of such bias was very high, as they had to show that there was a systematic striking of black jurors in the 
whole county, and not just in their own case. 
10 The burden of proof was significantly lessoned in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). Specifically, James Batson, a black 
defendant, was convicted of burglary in Kentucky by an all white jury. During voir dire, the prosecution used 
peremptory challenges on six potential jurors, including all four blacks in the jury pool. The defense moved to 
discharge the jury on the grounds that the defendant’s rights to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community 
and equal protection of the laws were violated. The trial judge denied the motion and the Kentucky Supreme Court 
affirmed the conviction on appeal. The appeal eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of 
the defendant and overruled Swain v. Alabama.  Batson v. Kentucky (1986) significantly lessened the burden of 
proof on the defendant, as a case for purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection in a particular case can 
potentially be made on the basis of the record in only that case.  
11 Baldus et. al. (2001) provide anecdotal evidence that race plays a role in jury selection. They describe a 1986 
attorney training video created by Philadelphia prosecutor Jack McMahon, which says that the ‘best’ jurors to obtain 
a conviction are conservative, middle class individuals of comparable intellectual ability. He says the ‘worst’ jurors 
are blacks from low-income areas who resent law enforcement and have a general tendency to resist authority. He 
also  says  that  prosecutors  should  particularly  avoid  black  female  jurors,  but  that  older b l a c k  m e n  w e r e  l e s s  
problematic. Additional anecdotal evidence is provided by Stevenson and Friedman (1994), who describe the trial of 
Albert Jefferson in Alabama. The prosecutor exercised his discretionary challenges against 24 of the 26 African 
Americans among the prospective jurors, resulting in an all white jury. Long after the trial, the defense discovered 
the prosecution’s juror ranking system: strong, medium, weak, and black (the least desirable category). ! 7!
have jurisdiction over misdemeanors, small claims (up to $5,000), civil cases of $15,000 and less, and 
traffic offenses. We will be studying felony jury trials in Sarasota County and Lake County and hence are 
using data from two circuit courts. Chapter 913 of The 2009 Florida Statutes provides details about the 
jury trial in Florida. First, all non-capital cases have 6-person juries with 0-2 alternates; capital cases have 
12-person juries. Second, the state and the defendant are both allocated equal numbers of peremptory 
challenges,  which  depend  on  the  type  of  offense.  If  the  offense  is  punishable  by  death  or  life 
imprisonment, then there are ten challenges; if the offense is punishable by imprisonment of more than 12 
months, then there are six challenges; for all other offenses, there are three challenges. 
  We obtained the following details specific to jury trials in Sarasota County Circuit Court and 
Lake County Circuit Court from the Courts’ websites and communications with administrators of the 
courts.
12 Both Sarasota and Lake Counties use one source list, driver’s licenses from the Department of 
Highway  Safety  and  Motor  Vehicles,  to  compile  the  master  jury  list.  Both  counties  use  a j u r y  
management software program to randomly choose individuals from this master list to receive a summons 
requesting that they appear at the courthouse on a particular date.
13 Some individuals who receive a 
summons are eligible for an automatic exemption and need not appear in court.
14 The eligibility criteria 
(also listed on the websites) are in line with those described in the general overview in the previous 
section.
15  
  Individuals who do not excuse themselves for the reasons stated above and who are eligible to 
serve check-in on the date summoned; upon check-in, they are entered into the jury management software 
program.
"# From the sample of checked-in individuals, this software randomly chooses individuals to 
participate in a particular panel. It is important to note that the jury management software program only 
utilizes data about jurors and does not have information about the defendants or case characteristics. 
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12 http://www.sarasotaclerk.com/default.asp?Page=68 ; http://lakecountyclerk.org/courts/jury_management.aspx  
13 Each juror in Lake County is assigned a group number on their summons. Individuals who receive a summons are 
instructed to call a recording prior to reporting. If their group number is called in, according to this recording, then 
the individual would report. The number of groups that are called is primarily determined by the number of trials in 
a given week. 
14 Individuals can be automatically excused if: (i) they are an expectant mother, (ii) they are a parent who is not 
employed full time and has custody of a child under 6, (iii) they are a full time law enforcement officer, (iv) they 
served as a juror in Sarasota county in the last 365 days, (v) they are responsible for the care of another who is 
incapable of caring for himself, or (vi) they are 70 or older and wish not to report (at this time or permanently). 
15 Perhaps of particular relevance for these jurisdictions is the fact that individuals are only eligible for jury duty if 
they are a legal resident of the State of Florida and Sarasota or Lake County and they possess a valid Florida driver’s 
license or identification card. Thus, individuals who are permanent residents of other states, such as Illinois or New 
York, but spend the winter months in Florida would not be eligible for jury duty. Thus, while there is potentially 
seasonal variation in the composition of the populations in Sarasota and Lake Counties, this seasonal variation 
should not affect the composition of the jury pool or jury. 
16 In Lake County, for instance, jurors check in using a form attached to their jury summons, which has a bar code 
on it. Scanning the bar code gives the potential juror “attendance for reporting” and places them into the pool. ! 8!
Individuals whose names are called out enter the courtroom to participate in voir dire, during which 
questioning is done by both the attorneys (defense and prosecution) and the judge.
"$  
    
Literature Review 
The majority of the literature that has examined the impact of jury composition on trial outcomes 
has used mock jury trials. Participants or “mock jurors” hear a condensed version of a trial, typically a 
one-page write-up of a court case and are asked individually whether they want to convict or acquit the 
defendant. These studies test for discrimination by keeping the summary of the case the same, but varying 
the race of the defendant.  
  Sommers (2007) provides a recent review of this literature and notes that the findings from these 
studies are mixed. Some studies (McGuire and Bermant, 1977 and Skolnick and Shaw, 1997) find that the 
defendant’s race does not have a consistent effect on white jurors; others (McGowen and King, 1982, and 
Poulson, 1990) find that white jurors treat white versus non-white defendants more severely; and still 
others show the exact opposite (DeSantis and Kayson, 1997; Hymes et. al., 1993; Klein and Creech, 
1982). Sommers (2007) highlights the fact that there is very little research that looks at whether black and 
white jurors are differentially affected by a defendant’s race. One exception, Skolnick and Shaw (1997), 
finds that white mock jurors rendered comparable decisions for black and white defendants while black 
mock jurors are more likely to convict white defendants. In contrast, Bernard (1979) found that white 
jurors showed less compassion, particularly towards black defendants, and that black jurors as a whole 
were more likely to acquit, regardless of race. 
Several studies by Sommers (2002, 2006) examine the difference in behavior of diverse versus 
homogenous juries. In these studies, Sommers created mock juries using jury eligible citizens for a rape 
trial  with  a  black  defendant  and  varied  the  racial  composition  of  the  jury.  He  found  that  the  racial 
composition of the jury influenced both the content and scope of the discussions between the jurors: 
compared to all white juries, racially mixed juries tended to deliberate longer, discuss more case facts, 
and raise more questions about what was missing from the trials. Diverse juries were also more likely to 
discuss race issues, such as profiling, during deliberations, with white jurors often raising these issues. 
Finally, he found that white jurors on racially mixed juries were less likely to vote to convict than white 
jurors on all white juries, even when the vote was taken before the deliberations occurred. This implies 
that white jurors can behave quite differently when they are seated with other whites versus when they are 
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17 Details about compensation are also available on the website. Jurors whose employers continue to pay them 
during jury service do not receive any additional compensation from the courts for the first three days of service. 
Jurors who are unemployed (or whose employers do not pay them while they are serving) receive $15.00 per day for 
the first three days. After three days of service, all jurors are paid $30.00 per day. ! 9!
seated  with  black  jurors.  Consistent  with  this,  Hans  and  Vidmar  (1982)  suggest  that  a  diverse  jury 
composition motivates whites to avoid the appearance of bias. 
The main drawback to these mock jury trials is their external validity. Of particular concern is the 
fact that most of these mock jurors are white college students with trial conditions and stakes that are 
much lower than those in a real criminal trial. Moreover, in the vast majority of studies, individuals reach 
their decision in isolation, quite unlike actual jury deliberations where jurors must deliberate collectively 
and reach a unanimous verdict.  Furthermore, the role of race may be much less central in mock trials, 
where the defendant’s race is simply noted when compared to an actual trial in which the defendant is 
seated in the same room as the jury.  
There are surprisingly few studies that use data from actual trials to examine the correlation 
between jury composition and trial outcomes. This can likely be attributed to there being (i) a limited 
number  of  jurisdictions  systematically  collecting  and  maintaining  data  regarding  jury  member 
demographics and (ii) an unwillingness of jurisdictions to share such data with researchers due to a lack 
of  resources  or  a  concern  that  juries  and/or  jury  pools  in  their  jurisdiction  might b e  f o u n d  to  be 
systematically non-representative. Two exceptions are Bowers et al. (2001) and Daudistel et al. (1999).  
Bowers et al. (2001) examined 340 capital trials and found that the greater the proportion of whites to 
blacks on the jury, the more likely a black defendant was to be sentenced to death, especially when the 
victim was white. Daudistel et al. (1999) find similar results for 317 non-felony juries in Texas comprised 
of whites and Latinos.
18 The main limitation of all of these previous studies is that the conclusions are 
based entirely on the correlation between jury composition and trial outcomes and, therefore, subject to 
serious concerns related to the non-random jury selection process. 
!
 
3.  Data 
Description of Jury Data from Sarasota and Lake Counties 
  Our analysis is conducted using felony jury trial data for Lake County and Sarasota County, 
Florida. As each county circuit court maintains their own records of jury trials, these data were obtained 
through  separate  requests  to e a c h  c o u n t y .  To  t h e  b e s t  o f  o u r  k n o wl e d g e ,  S a r a s o t a  Co u n t y  a n d  La k e  
County are the only two circuit courts in Florida (of reasonable size) that maintain information on the race 
of jurors and members of the jury pool. The inclusion of the race of each jury member, let alone each 
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18 Also of note, Lee (2009) finds evidence that states that switched from key-man jury selection procedures to more 
random selection procedures saw a resulting drop in the share of new admissions to prison accounted for by non-
whites and infers that having more blacks on the jury resulted in blacks being less likely to be convicted. In addition 
to the possibility that other unrelated factors (changes in the criminal behavior of whites versus non-whites over this 
period) had an effect on new prison admissions, it is impossible to tell whether Lee’s result is obtained simply 
because black and white jurors use different standards for all defendants or discriminate on the basis of defendant 
race. ! 10!
member of the jury pool, makes these data particularly unique.
19 Since a standardized record system is not 
used throughout Florida, the type of information and format of the data available vary somewhat across 
counties. Thus, the majority of our analysis is conducted with a single, combined data set of Lake and 
Sarasota County trials, using those variables that can be commonly identified in both counties. Following 
is a brief description of the data obtained for each county as well as the combined data set. 
  The office of the Clerk of the Sarasota County Circuit Court provided us with information on all 
felony trials for which jury selection began between January 1, 2004 and June 1, 2009. Note that because 
of the (oftentimes long) lag between the date at which an offense is filed with the courts and the date at 
which a verdict is rendered, our data set contains trials for offenses dating as far back as 1999. For each 
trial, we have data for both the defendant and the jury.   The defendant data includes the name, race, and 
gender of the defendant as well as information about the charged offenses, including a detailed crime 
code, the date that the offense was filed, the date that the judgment was handed down, and the verdict for 
each offense. For our main analysis, we restrict our sample to trials in which at least one of the charged 
offenses resulted in a verdict of guilty or not guilty by the jury.
20 The jury data includes the name, date of 
birth, gender, and race of each individual in the jury pool as well as whether or not they were seated. 
However, we cannot distinguish between individuals who are seated and those who became alternates; all 
of these individuals appear to be ‘seated’. 
  Data were also provided to us by the Lake County Clerk of Courts for all felony jury trials from 
March 1, 2000 to April 2, 2010. As in Sarasota County, we know each potential juror’s name, race, 
gender, date of birth, and whether they were seated or assigned as alternates.
21 In terms of the defendant 
information, the Lake County Clerk of Courts only provided the case number and defendant name. We 
used  this  information  to  manually  collect  the  following  information  from  the  Lake  County  Clerk  of 
Courts Online Court Records website: city of residence, sex, race, attorney, judge, the number of charges, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Generally, few courts maintain records that identify the race of each jury member and even fewer identify the race 
of the jury pool member; in fact, many do not even keep records of who was on the jury pool. To obtain the data 
used in this paper, we sent data request letters to every felony court in fifteen states: Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Most courts indicated that we could not conduct our research in their jurisdiction 
for one of the following reasons: (i) they do not collect demographic data from jurors, (ii) they collect the data but 
have no record of it, (iii) they do not have the man hours available to compile such data, and (iv) judicial records are 
excluded from public records request. 
20 Charges for which the verdict was neither guilty nor not guilty had the following possible outcomes: dropped, 
Noelle prosequi, filed, dismissed due to speedy trial, dismissed with no reason given, consolidated, adjudication 
withheld by judge and unable to stand trial. We will test the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of these cases. 
21 In Lake County, we can distinguish between alternates and those that are seated. However, we group all of these 
individuals together so that the Lake County measures conform to those for Sarasota County. ! 11!
the type of charge, and the verdict for each charge.
22 As in Sarasota, we restrict our sample to trials in 
which at least one of the charged offenses resulted in a verdict of guilty or not guilty by the jury.
23 
  Since all felony trials in Florida other than capital trials have six-member juries, we exclude 
capital trials from our analysis. Since each jury should have six members plus zero to two alternates, we 
drop those cases with less than six jurors/alternates identified in the data and those with more than 8. We 
also drop those cases with multiple defendants and those in which the defendant names do not match the 
online record (i.e. in Lake County).
24 We are left with a dataset of 785 felony jury trials, 401 of which are 
from Sarasota County and 384 of which are from Lake County. Our analysis focuses on the 712 trials in 
which the main dependent variables are defined and the defendant is identified as being either black (n = 
333) or white (n = 379).  
 
Summary Statistics 
  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for both the defendant and jury variables for all 785 felony 
trials overall and separately for the black and white defendants used in our analysis.
25 Overall, 44 percent 
of defendants are black and the average number of charges is 2.99. We identify whether each defendant is 
charged with an offense in the following categories, regardless of the verdict associated with the charge: 
murder  (non-capital),  robbery,  other  violent  offenses,  property  offenses,  drug  offenses,  sex  offenses, 
weapons offenses, and other offenses. Overall, the most common crime categories are other offenses (33 
percent), other violent offenses (31 percent), and drug offenses (25 percent). There are some differences 
in the distribution of crime types across defendant race: 38 percent of black defendants have at least one 
drug charge compared with 14 percent of white defendants. In contrast, 8 percent of black defendants are 
charged with a sex offense compared to 18 percent of white defendants. 
  We consider two possible outcome measures or verdicts: whether the defendant was convicted of 
at least one offense and the percent of the first five offenses for which the defendant was convicted. 74.5 
percent of black defendants and 70.2 percent of white defendants were convicted of at least one offense.
26 
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22 The data was collected from the following website:  
http://www.lakecountyclerk.org/record_searches/court_records_agreement.aspx?to=%2Frecord%5Fsearches%2Fonl
ine%5Fcourt%5Frecords%2Fonline%5Fcourt%5Frecords%2Easp?target%3D%5Fblank.  
23 Other possible verdicts include: pled, nolle prosequi, no information, dismissed by judge, and mistrial. We will 
test the sensitivity of our results to redefining pleas as decisions of guilty by the jury. 
24 Specifically, we drop eight Sarasota cases that have too few or too many jurors; capital cases are thus dropped as a 
result of having more than eight jurors. Note that in Lake County, the capital cases were not provided in the same 
data set, and hence, we do not ‘drop’ any capital cases.  In Lake County, we drop 13 cases that do not have six seated 
jurors, i.e. the jury is not correctly identified, 20 cases with multiple defendants, and two incorrectly labeled cases.  
25 In Appendix Table 1, we provide additional summary statistics separately for Lake and Sarasota County. 
26 One feature of the data to note is that there are generally lower conviction rates by juries in Lake County than in 
Sarasota County: 65 percent of Lake County charges result in a guilty jury verdict compared to 80 percent in ! 12!
On average, seated juries have seven members (including alternates) drawn from jury pools with 27 
individuals.
27  
Approximately 64 percent of cases had at least one black potential juror in the pool, while just 28 
percent of trials had at least one black member on the seated jury. These percentages are driven primarily 
by  the  small  proportion  of  blacks  in  the  jury  pool – 3 . 9  percent.
28 I n  f a c t ,  b l a c k s  a r e  s l i g h t l y  mo r e  
represented on seated juries (4.6 percent) than in the jury pool, implying that potential black jurors are 
slightly more likely to be seated than white jurors. Given the relatively small fraction of blacks in the 
population of Lake and Sarasota counties, the primary source of variation in our study is between jury 
pools with zero versus a small number of black potential jurors.  Because the population of the United 
States is approximately 12 percent black, such settings are more the norm than the exception.  That said, it 
is important to emphasize that the findings presented below may not be representative of the effect of jury 
race in jurisdictions with higher fractions of blacks in the population.  Such settings are essentially “out-
of-sample” and racial attitudes as well as juror interactions are likely to be different in jurisdictions with a 
much higher fraction of black residents. 
 Table 2 examines whether variation in the demographic composition of the jury pool across trials 
is uncorrelated with defendant and case characteristics, consistent with the notion that the jury pool varies 
quasi-randomly from trial to trial. Specifically, we regress a particular jury composition measure, such as 
whether there are any black jurors in the pool, on observable defendant and case characteristics.
29 If the 
jury pool were truly randomly assigned to cases, the regression coefficients should be close to zero and 
statistically insignificant. This is essentially what we find, as just two of the 48 coefficients presented in 
this table are statistically significant at the 5 percent level and the magnitudes of all coefficients are quite 
small.
30 While these regressions cannot rule out the possibility that the composition of the jury pool is 
related to attributes of the defendant or case that are unobserved to us, they suggest that this should not be 
a  major c o n c e r n .   These  results  are  also  consistent  with  the  jury  management  software ( i )   randomly 
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Sarasota. Given this and the differences in the racial composition of Sarasota and Lake Counties described below, 
we also present our results separately for each county. 
%$!While not reported in Table 1, the average composition of the jury pools is 51 percent female, 25 percent age 40 
or younger and 27 percent age 60 or older. These statistics are identical for defendants of each race.  The age and 
gender composition of the seated jury differs from these statistics by at most 2 percentage points. !!
28 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 9.4 percent of Lake County residents were black in 2009 compared to 4.8 
percent in Sarasota County.  Fukurai, Butler, and Booth (1991) and Sommers (2008) suggest numerous reasons that 
the jury pool is disproportionately less black than the population, including: (i) many blacks are disqualified because 
of  criminal  records,  (ii)  master  lists  are  based  on  driver  licenses  and  voter  registration  lists,  which  are 
disproportionately nonblack, (iii) blacks are less likely respond to a summons because they mistrust the judicial 
system, and (iv) source lists are often not updated as often as they should be, which could result in mobile citizens 
(renters) being difficult to reach. 
29 Note that 14 cases are dropped from these regressions due to incomplete charge information. 
30 Additional regressions of the gender and age composition of the pool on the defendant and case characteristics, 
reported in Appendix Table 2, provide further evidence of random assignment. Again, just two of 48 coefficients are 
significant at the five percent level. ! 13!
choosing  potential  jurors  from  the  master  list  to  receive  summons  for  jury  duty a n d  ( i i )  r a n d o m l y  




4.  The Effect of the Racial Composition of the Jury Pool on Conviction Rates 
In this section, we examine the impact of the racial composition of the jury pool on conviction 
rates for white and black defendants. The left panels of Table 3 present cross-tabulations that show how 
conviction rates vary with whether there are any blacks in the jury pool. When there are no potential black 
jurors in the pool, black defendants are significantly more likely than whites to be convicted of at least 
one crime (81 percent for blacks versus 66 percent for whites). However, as the number of blacks in the 
pool increases, this differential goes away: in fact, with at least one black member of the jury pool, 
conviction rates are almost identical (71 percent for blacks and 73 percent for whites).  The right panels of 
Table 3 show how conviction rates vary with the number of blacks in the pool. Given the sample sizes, 
the data is fairly noisy once there are multiple black jurors in the pool and so, throughout the rest of the 
paper, we focus on the variation between cases in which there are no blacks in the pool and cases in 
which there is at least one.  
  The first column of Table 4 expresses these results in regression form: the dependant variable is 
an indicator for whether the defendant was convicted of at least one charged crime and the regressors 
include indicators for: (i) whether the defendant is black, (ii) whether there are any black jurors in the 
pool, and (iii) the interaction of these two variables. Column (2) reports these key coefficients from a 
specification that includes additional control variables for the gender and age composition of the pool, a 
county  dummy,  and  a s e t  o f  d u m m y  v a r i a b l e s  f o r  t h e  y e a r  o f  f i l i n g .    Including  controls  for  other 
characteristics of the jury pool accounts for potential correlations between jury race, gender, and age and 
adding year dummies addresses the possibility that crime patterns or convictions rates may be trending 
systematically over time. In all cases, the additional control variables described above are fully interacted 
with the defendant’s race. This allows for the possibility that these control variables have a differential 
effect for black and white defendants, just as we have allowed for the racial composition of the jury 
pool.
32  
The  point  estimates  for  the t h r e e  k e y  coefficients  are  remarkably  robust  and  statistically 
significant  in  the  specification t h a t  i n c l u d e s c o n t r o l s .  For  expositional  convenience,  we  use  the 
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31 Appendix Table 3 provides a direct comparison of the average of each demographic and case characteristic for jury 
pools with and without any black members. These means are only significantly different at the five percent level for 
one variable, total charges, supporting our claim that jury pools are randomly assigned to cases. 
32 In addition, each control variable is demeaned (prior to being interacted), which ensures that the main coefficients 
in Table 4 are reported at the sample mean in each specification and therefore comparable; i.e. there is no need to 
look at the coefficients on the interaction variables included in the vector of controls. ! 14!
specification reported in Column (2) as our benchmark specification for the remainder of the paper and 
discuss the results referring to this specification. The coefficient estimates in this benchmark specification 
support three main conclusions. First, there is a large (16 percentage point) gap in conviction rates for 
black versus white defendants when there are no blacks in the jury pool. Second, the gap in conviction 
rates for black versus white defendants is significantly lower when there is at least one black member in 
the jury pool. In fact, the point estimate implies that the entire gap is eliminated in this case. And, third, 
conviction rates for white defendants are sharply (10.5 percentage points) higher when there is at least 
one black member of the jury pool (versus all-white jury pools).
33 The third and fourth columns of Table 
4 repeat the same structure as the first two columns using the fraction of the first five offenses on which 
the defendant was found guilty as the dependant variable. The results are similar in both magnitude and 
statistical significance.  
Before considering the robustness of these findings to additional alternative explanations, it is 
worth  emphasizing  that  the  coefficient  estimates  reported  in  Table 4  a r e  n o t  o n l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  t h e  
statistical sense but are also large in magnitude.
34 Given that very few jury pools have more than two 
black members, the results presented above reveal large changes in conviction rates with the addition of 
just one or two black members to an otherwise homogeneously white jury pool. Moreover, it is important 
to bear in mind that the magnitude of these effects reflects the average impact potential black jurors have 
on conviction rates regardless of whether they are actually seated on the trial jury – in fact, each black 
member of the jury pool has about a one-third chance of being seated. In the next section of the paper, we 
discuss ways in which members of the jury pool might affect trial outcomes both when they are seated 
and when they are dismissed through peremptory challenges. 
Table 5 reports estimates for a number of alternative specifications using whether the defendant 
was  convicted  of  at  least  one  crime  as  the  dependant  variable.  Column  (1)  repeats  the  benchmark 
specification (Column 2 of Table 4). Column (2) of Table 5 reports estimates for a specification that 
includes controls for a set of additional defendant and case characteristics (gender, offense category, and 
number of offenses) fully interacted with the jury pool composition.
35 Controlling for defendant and case 
characteristics  addresses  the  possibility  that  the  effect  of  jury  race  on  conviction  rates  is  not  driven 
directly by the race of the defendant but by other differences across cases (e.g., the type of offense the 
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33 T h e  f i n d i n g s  f r o m  t h i s  b e n c h m a r k  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  a r e  a l s o  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  a n d  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  c o m p a r a b l e  w h e n  
estimated via a probit model rather than a linear probability model. Specifically, the estimated marginal effects are: 
Black Defendant (0.18), Any Blacks in Pool (0.10), and Black Defendant*Any Blacks in Pool (-0.19). Each of these 
estimates is significant at the 5 or 1 percent level. 
34 While not reported in Table 4, the specifications reported in Columns (2) and (4) here also provide estimates of 
the way that other aspects of jury composition affect racial gaps in convictions.  It is worth noting that neither age 
nor gender has a significant (in magnitude or statistically) impact on the racial gaps in conviction rates. 
35 As above, when interactions of the controls and jury composition are included, the point estimates are reported at 
the mean to ensure comparability across specifications. ! 15!
defendant is charged with) that are correlated with defendant race. In effect, the specification shown in 
Column (2) compares outcomes by defendant and jury race within the same crime category. Despite 
adding twenty additional control variables to a regression with 712 observations, the point estimates for 
all three key coefficients remain similar to the benchmark specification and statistically significant at 
standard  confidence  levels.  Column  (3)  adds  a  full  set  of  judge  fixed  effects  fully  interacted  with 
defendant race (50 variables in all) to the benchmark specification, again leading to essentially the same 
conclusions both qualitatively and quantitatively.
36 
Columns (4)-(6) consider the robustness of the results to alternative ways of categorizing trial 
outcomes that are not simple verdicts of “guilty” or “not guilty” by the jury. For instance, Column (4) 
redefines as guilty 133 cases in Lake County that are pled by the defendant at some point after a jury pool 
is chosen (but before the case actually goes to the jury). It is theoretically ambiguous whether such cases 
should be included in the analysis (categorized as guilty verdicts). On the one hand, it makes sense to 
include them if these plea bargains are reached because the composition of the jury implies that a guilty 
verdict is very likely.  On the other hand, if these plea bargains are reached for reasons unrelated to the 
jury  composition  (as  they  would  be  if  reached  prior  to  jury  selection),  including  them  biases  the 
coefficients towards zero as the outcome is, by construction, the same for all of these trials regardless of 
the jury composition.
37 Column (5) recodes those 25 Sarasota cases that did not have guilty or not guilty 
jury verdicts associated with it (see footnote 20) as not guilty while Column (6) repeats the same exercise, 
coding these cases as guilty. In all cases, the results are very similar to the benchmark results reported in 
Column (1) of Table 5.  
Table 6 explores the heterogeneity of the results across a number of different subsamples.  Given 
the relatively small number of observations in each of these specifications, we report results for the 
baseline specification (i.e., without any additional control variables). Column (1) repeats the baseline 
specification (Column 1 of Table 4), while columns (2) and (3) report analogous specifications, estimated 
separately for Lake and Sarasota Counties, respectively. These specifications reveal a remarkably similar 
qualitative pattern of results in each county; the magnitude of the key coefficients is generally greater in 
Lake County.  
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36 Whi l e i t  mi ght  seem pr efer abl e t o use t he speci fi cat i on t hat  i ncl udes case and defendant  char act er i st i cs and 
interactions (20 additional variables) or that includes judge fixed effects and interactions (50 additional variables) as 
the benchmark specification for all subsequent analyses, we are concerned that the limited size of our sample would 
lead to over-fitting the data when so many incidental parameters are added to the specification.  As a result, we use 
the more parsimonious specification reported in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 as the benchmark specification 
throughout the rest of our analysis. 
37 It appears that many of the plea bargains included here are reached the day the case is scheduled to be heard in 
court but before voir dire begins. In particular, in about one-third of cases, we observe data characterizing the 
composition of the jury pool but not a seated jury, suggesting that voir dire did not actually occur in these cases.      ! 16!
The final three columns of Table 6 examine heterogeneity across crime categories, reporting 
separate estimates for defendants charged with drug, violent, and property crimes, respectively.
38 While 
the standard errors are larger than for the full sample due to the small number of observations in each 
crime category, many of the key coefficients are statistically significant and especially large for drug and 
violent crimes.  The point estimates imply that all-white jury pools convict black defendants of drug 
crimes at an almost 25 percentage point higher rate than white defendants and that this gap is not only 
eliminated but even reversed when at least one black potential juror is added to the pool. In this case, the 
gap closes both because conviction rates for white defendants rise while those for blacks fall significantly. 
A similar pattern emerges for violent crimes, although the only coefficient that is statistically significant 
in this case is the interaction term, which implies that adding at least one black potential juror to the pool 
decreases conviction rates for black defendants relative to whites. The impact of jury race is statistically 
insignificant for property crimes; if anything, the point estimates imply that jury pools with at least one 
black member are more favorable to white versus black defendants for these crimes. 
 
5.  Understanding the Impact of Jury Race on Trial Outcomes 
The evidence presented in Tables 2-6 leads to a number of robust conclusions about the impact of 
the racial composition of the jury pool on trial outcomes. Having established these main results, we now 
consider possible mechanisms through which the jury pool might affect conviction rates and attempt to 
distinguish which mechanisms are most consistent with the pattern of trial outcomes and jury selection 
observed in the data. 
 
Possible Mechanisms 
The most direct way that the racial composition of the jury pool might affect trial outcomes is 
through its impact on the racial composition of the seated jury. It is, of course, impossible to have any 
black members on the seated jury if there are no black members in the jury pool. Black members of the 
seated jury might affect trial outcomes in a number of ways, including through: (i) the jury deliberation 
and  decision  process  and  (ii)  the  way  that  the  attorneys  present  the  evidence  in  the  case.  In  the 
deliberation and decision process, a black member of the seated jury could have an effect on the outcome 
either if she was generally more (or less) likely to vote to convict than the white juror that she replaced or 
if her presence changed the nature of the deliberations, thereby affecting the votes of the other white 
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38 Note that it is possible for defendants to be charged with multiple crimes. The dependant variable here is whether 
the defendant was found guilty of the crime in the corresponding category. These dependant variables are only 
defined, however, for those cases in which a jury verdict was reached in the given category. Given the small sample 
sizes, the large set of benchmark controls are excluded from these specifications; when they are included, the 
qualitative pattern of results remains but there is a decrease in precision. ! 17!
members of the jury. The latter could arise if the black member of the jury was able to contribute a unique 
perspective to the jury deliberations or if white jurors were more concerned about appearing racially 
biased in the presence of a black colleague. 
The addition of one or two blacks to the jury pool could also have an indirect effect on trial 
outcomes even when no blacks are seated on the jury. If the attorneys can use observable attributes of 
potential jurors (e.g., age, appearance, race) along with their answers to pre-trial questioning to form ex 
ante expectations of their likelihoods of conviction, we would generally expect the attorneys on each side 
to use their peremptory challenges to strike those potential jurors most likely to be hostile to their side. As 
a result, whenever an attorney uses a peremptory challenge to strike a black potential juror, she forgoes 
the possibility of excluding another potential juror with a similar ex ante likelihood of convicting. Put 
another way, even when black potential jurors are struck via peremptory challenges, they are essentially 
replaced on the jury by white jurors with similar attitudes towards the case.
39  
Figures 1-3 illustrate the logic of this indirect effect on trial outcomes. We begin by considering a 
setting in which the jury pool is homogeneously white.  Figure 1 depicts a normal distribution !w(x) with 
mean µw that characterizes the ex ante likelihood of conviction for white potential jurors. Jurors with 
higher values of x are more likely to convict; for example, the probability of conviction might be written 
P(x) = exp(x)/(1+exp(x)). To keep this illustration simple, we assume that jurors affect outcomes only 
through their position x and that the attorneys use their peremptory challenges to strike the potential jurors 
that are most likely to be hostile to their side; we discuss the implications of relaxing these assumptions 
below. In this way, defense attorneys strike those potential jurors with ex ante probabilities of conviction 
in the upper tails of the distribution while the prosecution strikes potential jurors in the lower tail. If each 
attorney strikes a fixed percentage of the jury pool, the seated jury would consist of jurors drawn from 
truncated distributions with cutoffs xH and xL.    
  Note  that  throughout  this  section, w e  i g n o r e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i n  actual  trials a  f i n i t e  n u m b e r  o f  
potential jurors are drawn from these distributions and so the truncation points will vary from case to 
case. Instead, for expositional simplicity, we assume that a continuum of jurors is in the pool and that 
attorneys on each side can strike a fixed percentage of jurors. 
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39 The presence of black jurors in the pool might also affect trial outcomes indirectly if pre-trial interactions among 
members of the jury pool alter the attitudes of the white jurors who are ultimately seated. ! 18!
 
Figure 1: The Distribution of x for White Jurors in Pool 
!
Note:  This distribution characterizes the ex ante likelihood of conviction for white potential jurors.  Jurors with 
higher values of x are more likely to convict, and thus the defense will use their peremptory challenges to strike jurors 
in the upper tail, while the prosecution will strike jurors in the lower tail.   
!
Figure 2 considers a setting with at least some black potential jurors in the pool.  It depicts two 
normal  distributions !w(x)  and  !B(x) wi t h  me a n s  µw a n d  µB t h a t  d e t e r mi n e  t h e  ex  ante l i k e l i h o o d  o f  
conviction  for  white  and  black  potential  jurors,  respectively.  For  expositional  convenience,  we  have 
drawn normal distributions with the same variance and with!µw > µB, which, given our main results above, 
might illustrate the case of a black defendant. An analogous figure that is consistent with our findings for 
white defendants could be created by switching the locations of !w(x) and !B(x) in the figure.  
As illustrated in Figure 2, compared to a world with only white potential jurors, adding black 
potential jurors to the pool puts more weight in the overall distribution of the jury pool on lower levels of 




40 In thinking about where the truncation points should be drawn in Figure 2, it is important to keep in mind that the 
distribution function for the full jury will more closely resemble the distribution for whites since jury pools in the 
data are generally less than 5 percent black.   ! 19!
!
Figure 2: The Distribution of x for White and Black Jurors in Pool 
Note:  This figure shows how the truncation points will change when black jurors are added to the pool.  Based on 
our  main  empirical  results,  these  black  and  white  juror  distributions  might  illustrate  the  situation  for  a  black 
defendant.  Compared to Figure 1, where there were only white potential jurors, adding black jurors to the pool shifts 




Figure 3 repeats Figure 2 but shades the regions of the distributions affected by the addition of 
some potential black jurors to the jury pool.  There are two effects of adding blacks to the jury pool.  
First, those blacks with values of x between the truncation points xH* and xL* are seated on the jury.  The 
likelihood of conviction of the blacks that are seated on the jury forms the basis for the direct effect 
described above.
41 Second, because the prosecution now uses some of its peremptory challenges to strike 
black potential jurors drawn from the lower tail, it has fewer challenges left to remove potential white 
jurors  with  relatively  low  probabilities  of  conviction.  As  a  result,  white  jurors  between  the  lower 
truncation points xL and xL* are now seated on the jury. The addition of these whites to the jury forms the 
basis for the indirect effect described above.   
Relative to the case of the all-white jury pool, the new black and white jurors that are seated when 
blacks are in the pool are much less likely to convict than the set of white jurors they replace on the seated 
jury – those with ex ante likelihoods of conviction between truncation points xH and xH*.  Moreover, 
notice that the average position of seated black jurors is actually significantly higher than the marginal 
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41 Specifically, the average position of seated black jurors, µB*, is lower than the average position of white jurors 
seated when the pool is all-white, µw. Notice also that because the blacks least likely to convict are struck by the 
prosecution, the mean of the truncated distribution for blacks on the seated jury is higher than that for those in the 
jury pool: µB* > µB. ! 20!
white jurors that are added because the prosecution uses some of its peremptory challenges to strike 
potential blacks jurors in the lower tail of the distribution.  This suggests that the indirect effect has the 
potential to be quite large, even compared to the direct effect. 
!
Figure 3: The Impact of Adding Black Jurors to the Jury Pool 
Note:  This figure represents the same situation as Figure 2, but explicitly shows the direct and indirect effect of 
adding black jurors to the pool.  A direct effect occurs because those blacks with values of x between the truncation 
points xH
* and xL
* will be seated on the jury.  An indirect effect occurs because the distribution of potential jurors 
shifts to the left when black jurors are added to the pool.  This means the prosecution will not be able to remove as 
many white jurors in the lower tail as before, while the defense can now strike more white jurors in the upper tail.  
As a result, adding black jurors to the pool results in whites from the upper tail of the distribution being replaced on 
the seated jury by whites from the lower tail.   
 
  In addition to illustrating the indirect mechanism through which the racial composition of the jury 
pool can affect trial outcomes, this simple description of the jury selection process can also help to 
explain a number of patterns in the data. For example, the within-race heterogeneity depicted in Figures 
1-3 provides a coherent potential explanation for why black members of the jury pool might be seated at 
rates roughly comparable to their white counterparts. In particular, as long as there is a significant amount 
of overlap in the ex ante probabilities of conviction for white and black potential jurors, the substantial 
fraction of black members of the pool with values of x between the truncation points xH* and xL* will be 
seated. We discuss other motives that attorneys might have to seat black jurors – e.g., to avoid charges of 
racial discrimination – in more detail below. 
 
Comparing with Estimates of the Effect of the Seated Jury on Trial Outcomes ! 21!
Table 7 exami nes how t he convi ct i on r at es  of  whi t e and bl ack def endant s  ar e related  to t he 
proportion of blacks on the seated jury as well as the jury pool for our two main dependant variables. In 
all cases, the specifications include controls that correspond to the benchmark specification described 
above.
42 Columns (1) and (3) repeat the estimates of the impact of the racial composition of the jury pool 
on conviction from Table 4.  Given the quasi-random variation in the composition of the jury pool, these 
estimates can be given a clear causal interpretation.  The regressions reported in the columns (2) and (4) 
of Table 7 condition on the composition of the seated jury, which is non-random, and, therefore, should 
not be given a causal interpretation.  Instead they should be viewed as simply describing how conviction 
rates vary with the composition of the seated jury.   
Columns (2) and (4) report parameter estimates for OLS regressions that relate trial outcomes to 
the race of the seated jury. Strikingly, the coefficients that characterize the black-white conviction rate 
gap when there is at least one black member seated on the jury are almost exactly the same size as the 
estimated impact of having at least one black potential juror in the pool (e.g., 0.166 vs. 0.164). That these 
point estimates are roughly the same size despite the fact that a black juror is seated only 40 percent of the 
time that there is a black member of the jury pool suggests that jury race has a broader impact than what a 
simple analysis of the effect of the seated jury would seem to imply. Put another way, our primary results 
imply that the black-white conviction gap declines by an average of 16 percentage points in all trials in 
which there is at least one black member of the jury pool.  A naive OLS analysis of the effect of the 
seated jury, however, would instead appear to imply that such a decline occurred only in the smaller 
subset of cases in which a black juror was seated.
43 
 
Putting the Magnitude of the Estimated Effects in Context  
  If the simple theoretical framework illustrated in Figures 1-3 approximates the jury selection 
process and trial outcomes are only a function of the x positions of the members of the seated jury, the 
magnitudes of our main findings imply that the distributions of the ex ante conviction rates must be fairly 
diffuse.  In particular, our results suggest that by randomly adding just one to two black jurors to a pool of 
27 potential jurors, conviction rates for white defendants increase by 6-11 percentage points (depending 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 That is, they include controls for the gender and age of the jury pool, county, and year of filing. 
&'!While it might seem natural to report IV estimates of the effect of the composition of the seated jury on conviction 
rates, instrumenting for the presence of blacks on the seated jury with the presence of blacks in the jury pool, such 
estimates could be interpreted as the causal LATE (Local Average Treatment Effect) under the strong assumption 
that the only channel through which the presence of blacks in the jury pool affects trial outcomes is by increasing the 
likelihood of having blacks on the seated jury.  If, on the other hand, any of the indirect channels discussed above 
are important, the IV estimates do not have a clear interpretation and so, to avoid confusion, we do not report IV 
estimates here. Because at least one black juror is seated in approximately 40 percent of the cases in which there is a 
black potential juror in the pool, the first stage of such an IV regression has a coefficient of about 0.40 and, as a 
result, the IV coefficients on jury race are about 2.5 times greater in magnitude than those reported for the OLS 
regressions reported in Columns (2) and (5). !! 22!
on  the  exact  specification)  and  decrease  by  a  comparable  amount  for  black  defendants.
44 W e  d r a w  
attention here to two considerations that have implications for interpreting the magnitudes of the effects. 
  First, it is important to note that of all the possible cases that a district attorney (prosecutor) could 
bring against potential defendants, a very small fraction go to trial and are decided by a jury verdict. On 
the one hand, in cases where the quality of the evidence is insufficient to generate a reasonable ex ante 
probability of conviction, the prosecution is likely to drop the charges rather than bring the case to trial.  
This  has  the  benefit  of  saving  time  spent  preparing  and  presenting  the  case  at  trial  and  preserving 
reasonably high conviction rates for cases brought to trial, a metric on which prosecutors are often judged. 
Likewise, in many cases where both sides expect a guilty verdict, pre-trial plea bargains are reached; 
these minimize the prosecutor’s trial costs and ensure a guilty verdict, often in exchange for a lighter 
sentence. In fact, almost 90 percent of criminal defendants in U.S. District Courts plead guilty and 97 
percent of all convictions are the result of plea rather than a conviction by a court or jury.
45  As a result of 
these pre-trial selection mechanisms, the set of cases that go to trial are systematically more likely to be 
those where the quality of the evidence is in considerable dispute among the parties. Thus, it might not be 
terribly surprising if potential jurors have fairly diffuse ex ante conviction rates for this especially select 
subset of cases. 
     Second, as we mentioned above, it may be possible for certain members of the jury to have an 
impact on the trial and deliberations that goes beyond the impact of their ex ante likelihood of conviction.  
If the inclusion of a black member on the seated jury impacts the way that the trial is presented by the 
attorneys or the way that white jurors deliberate, the seated black juror could essentially pull the other 
members of the jury towards his or her position, thereby strengthening the direct effect described above.  
Of course, we would generally expect the attorneys to take this into account and, therefore, be more likely 
to strike black jurors ceteris paribus.  In the example illustrated in Figure 3, this would have the effect of 
shifting the threshold for black potential jurors higher, resulting in black potential jurors being seated at 
lower rates and those that were seated being more systematically selected from the upper portion of the 
distribution of ex ante conviction rates and, therefore more similar to white jurors.   
This rationale for striking more black potential jurors may be countered, however, by concerns 
among attorneys about not wanting to use (or to appear to be using) race as a factor in exercising their 
peremptory challenge.  Specifically, prosecutors may want to avoid a claim by the defense that the trial 
should be invalidated on the grounds that there were no blacks selected onto the jury; such a challenge has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 While we have attempted to remain agnostic throughout the paper about how juries with heterogeneous ex ante 
conviction  probabilities  reach  unanimous  decisions  in  cases  that  are  not  clear  cut  (and  juries  generally  return 
verdicts in almost every case), it is worth noting that the existing literature (Kalvin and Ziesel, 1966, Hastie, Penrod, 
and Pennington, 1983, and Sandys and Dillehay, 1995) suggests that majority rule is the most appropriate way to 
model these decisions. 
45 See http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/JudicialFactsAndFigures2009.aspx. ! 23!
come to be termed a “Batson challenge”.  If attorneys in fact place some weight on seating black jurors 
roughly in proportion to their representation in the jury pool when using their peremptory challenges, they 
may  set  the  ex  ante  conviction  rate  threshold  for  black  potential  jurors  differently  than  they  do  for 
whites.
46  Returning to Figure 3, by setting a threshold for seating black potential jurors at a value xL** 
below xL*, prosecutors would seat a higher fraction of black jurors, thereby also lowering the mean 
position of the seated black jury members, µB**. This would tend to increase the size of the direct effect 
without having much impact on the indirect effect.   
 
6. Implications and Conclusion 
Given the main findings presented in Section 4 and the discussion of potential mechanisms in 
Section 5, we conclude the paper with a discussion of the implications of our results for the fair and equal 
application of the law. Most plainly, our main findings imply that conviction rates for black and white 
defendants are similar when there is at least some representation of blacks in the jury pool but that in the 
absence of such representation, black defendants are substantially more likely to be convicted. Defendants 
of each race do relatively better when the jury pool contains more members of their own race and, as a 
result, black defendants are clearly disadvantaged relative to their white counterparts when the proportion 
of blacks in the jury pool is so small.  
Another immediate implication of our main findings is that the application of criminal justice in 
these Florida counties is highly uneven, as a small change in the composition of the jury pool (i.e., adding 
one black member) has a large impact on the conviction rates of black versus white defendants. While 
heterogeneity in the jury pool is obviously unavoidable, a potentially desirable feature of a justice system 
is that jury verdicts are not arbitrary given the evidence. In this context, increasing the number of jurors 
on  the  seated  jury  would  substantially  reduce  the  variability  of  the  trial  outcomes,  increase  black 
representation in the jury pool and on seated juries, and make trial outcomes more equal for white and 
black defendants.
47 
What our results imply regarding the fairness of jury trials for defendants of each race is much 
more  difficult  to  say.  As  the  discussion  of  Section  5  makes  clear,  when  jurors  have  heterogeneous 
likelihoods of conviction, any random variation in the jury pool will affect the likelihood that the seated 
jury convicts the defendant. But, such a model has nothing to say about which juror in the distribution is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Note that if prosecutors had especially high rates of excluding black potential jurors when the defendant was 
black, this pattern would be straightforward to detect over time using a data set like the one used in our analysis. 
47 See Waters (2004) for a review of the existing literature concerned with the effect of jury size on court costs, jury 
representativeness, and the variability of trial outcomes (particularly in civil cases). For instance, Zeisel (1971) 
suggests that if a population is comprised of a minority of 10 percent, then a sample of 12-person juries will have a 
72 percent chance of seating at least one such minority, but a sampling of 6-person juries will only have a 47 percent 
chance of seating a minority. ! 24!
applying the most appropriate ex ante standard of evidence for defendants of each race.  The problem is 
that without any direct measure of the objective strength of the evidence that is brought in cases with 
black versus white defendants, we have no way of discerning what relative conviction rates for black 
versus white defendants should be. If, in fact, the quality of the evidence brought in the cases of white and 
black defendants in our sample is comparable, our results would imply that juries formed from all-white 
jury pools require a weaker standard of evidence to convict black versus white defendants. This is a very 
serious potential implication of our analysis, but one that we cannot reach conclusively without knowing 
more about the quality of evidence presented in each case. 
While gauging the objective quality of the evidence in the cases in our sample is beyond the 
scope of this paper, future research could use objective and subjective analyses of the trial transcripts in 
these cases to provide further insight into the fairness question. If, for example, experimental subjects 
were presented with trial transcripts (neutral as to the race of the defendants), it would be possible to 
measure whether the quality of the evidence in the cases with black defendants was in fact comparable to 
those with white defendants. Such an analysis could be done within crime category and could conceivably 
test whether black and white experimental subjects respond differently to the evidence, when presented in 
a way that did not directly indicate the race of the defendant.
48   
  A final implication of our analysis follows from the fact that trials with all-white jury pools result 
in higher conviction rates for black defendants and lower conviction rates for whites relative to jury pools 
with at least one black potential juror. This pattern is generally inconsistent with a world in which jurors 
of each race apply the same standard of evidence for defendants of both races. More specifically, if jurors 
of each race perceive the evidence presented in a trial identically and apply the same standard of evidence 
to white and black defendants, it may be possible for jurors of one race to require a higher (lower) 
standard  of  evidence  to  convict  and,  therefore, c o n v i c t  defendants  of  both  races l e s s  ( m o r e )  o f t e n .
 
Importantly, in this case, if jurors are applying the same standards, it is impossible for conviction rates for 
defendants of one race to rise while those for defendants of the other race to fall no matter what the 
distribution of quality of evidence is for defendants of each race (Anwar and Fang, 2006). Put another 
way, if jurors of one race are generally tougher, then they had better be tougher on all defendants or the 
evidence would suggest that they are not applying the same standards.   
  The crossing pattern exhibited by our main findings thus leads to our final conclusion: that jurors 
of at least one race (and possibly both) either interpret evidence differently depending on the race of the 
defendant or use a standard of evidence that varies with the race of the defendant. Either possibility 
implies that the interaction of defendant and jury race fundamentally alters the mapping of evidence to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Clearly such an analysis would be subject to concerns about the credibility of the evaluation of evidence by 
experimental subjects in a non-trial setting discussed above.  ! 25!
conviction rates and, thus, that the impact of the racial composition of the jury pool (and seated jury) is a 
factor that merits much more attention and analysis in order to ensure the fairness of the criminal justice 
system. 
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   All Cases     Black Defendants     White Defendants 
   Mean  Sd     Mean  Sd     Mean  Sd 
Defendant Characteristics                 
Black Defendant  0.44  0.50    1  0    0  0 
Hispanic Defendant  0.04  0.20    0  0    0  0 
White Defendant  0.51  0.50    0  0    1  0 
Male Defendant  0.92  0.27    0.95  0.21    0.89  0.32 
 
Case Characteristics                 
Total Charges  2.99  3.57    2.79  2.33    3.26  4.55 
Any Drug Charge  0.25  0.44    0.37  0.49    0.14  0.35 
Any Murder Charge  0.05  0.22    0.06  0.25    0.05  0.21 
Any Robbery Charge  0.09  0.29    0.15  0.36    0.05  0.21 
Any Other Violent Charge  0.31  0.46    0.31  0.46    0.30  0.46 
Any Property Charge  0.23  0.42    0.21  0.41    0.25  0.43 
Any Sex Charge  0.13  0.34    0.08  0.27    0.18  0.38 
Any Weapons Charge  0.12  0.33    0.18  0.39    0.08  0.27 
Any Other Charge  0.33  0.47    0.26  0.44    0.37  0.48 
 
Dependant Variables                 
Proportion Guilty Convictions  0.670  0.439    0.686  0.432    0.641  0.450 
Any Guilty Convictions  0.728  0.445    0.745  0.437    0.702  0.458 
 
Pool and Seated Jury Characteristics               
Number of Seated Jurors  7.11  0.483    7.12  0.476    7.11  0.496 
Number in Jury Pool  27.3  7.3    26.9  7.0    27.6  7.6 
Any Black in Pool  0.64  0.48    0.63  0.48    0.65  0.48 
Any Black on Seated Jury  0.28  0.45    0.29  0.45    0.26  0.44 
Proportion Black on Seated Jury  0.046  0.080    0.051  0.089    0.040  0.069 
Proportion Black in Pool  0.039  0.040    0.040  0.043    0.038  0.038 
Observations  785        333        379    
Note - The first two columns report summary statistics for the full sample of 785 cases for which a jury was selected and the 
variable under consideration is defined. In particular, defendant race is defined for 774 cases, defendant gender for 776 
cases, specific crime categories for 776 cases, total charges for 773 cases, the dependant variables for 750 cases, and the 
pool and seated jury variables for the full sample of 785 cases.  The latter columns report summary statistics for cases with 
black defendants  (N=333) and white defendants (N=379), respectively, in which a verdict of guilty or not guilty by the jury 
was returned for at least one of the charged offenses.  Together, the observations in these columns make up the sample used 
in our main analysis. Summary statistics for the proportion variables (i.e., proportion guilty convictions, proportion black on 
seated jury, and proportion black in pool) were formed by measuring the proportion for each jury or jury pool and averaging 
across cases.   
 Table  2:    The  Relationship  Between  the  Racial  Composition  of  the  Jury  Pool  and  Defendant/Case 
Characteristics 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  
Indicator for Any 
Blacks in Pool 
Proportion of 
Blacks in Pool 
Proportion of 
Whites in Pool 
Proportion of 
Other Races in 
Pool 
 
Defendant Characteristics       
Black Defendant  -0.008  0.003  -0.004  0.001 
  [0.039]  [0.003]  [0.005]  [0.003] 
Hispanic Defendant  0.005  0.004  -0.003  -0.001 
  [0.088]  [0.008]  [0.011]  [0.006] 
Male Defendant  0.043  0.006  -0.009  0.002 
  [0.067]  [0.005]  [0.007]  [0.004] 
 
Case Characteristics         
Any Drug Charge  -0.029  -0.0003  0.004  -0.003 
  [0.051]  [0.004]  [0.006]  [0.004] 
Any Murder Charge  0.093  -0.002  -0.006  0.006 
  [0.076]  [0.006]  [0.008]  [0.005] 
Any Other Charge  0.007  0.002  -0.004  -0.0005 
  [0.040]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.003] 
Any Other Violent Charge  0.0001  0.004  -0.004  -0.0003 
  [0.042]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.003] 
Any Property Charge  0.078  0.013***  -0.006  -0.008** 
  [0.047]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.003] 
Any Robbery Charge  -0.026  -0.005  0.004  0.0001 
  [0.065]  [0.005]  [0.008]  [0.005] 
Any Sex Charge  0.07  0.002  0.001  -0.004 
  [0.058]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.004] 
Any Weapons Charge  0.075  -0.001  0.001  0.0002 
  [0.054]  [0.004]  [0.006]  [0.004] 
Total Charges  0.008*  5x10
-5  0.0002  -0.0003 
  [0.003]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Constant  0.541***  0.028***  0.942***  0.029*** 
  [0.074]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.005] 
Observations  771  771  771  771 
F-statistic  1.40  1.13  0.68  1.07 
R-squared  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01 
 
Note:  Each column reports parameter estimates and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors from OLS regressions using 
the variable in the column heading as the dependent variable. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent; and 1 percent levels, respectively.  The crime categories are not mutually exclusive, so there is no 
omitted crime category.  F-statistics jointly testing whether all coefficients equal zero are reported in the second to last row 
of the table.  Fourteen observations from the full sample shown in Table 1 were dropped due to one or more missing values 
for the various defendant and case characteristics.  Table 3:  Cross Tabulations of Conviction Rates and Racial Composition of Jury Pool 
Black Defendants 


















No  24  100  81%    0  24  100  81% 
                 
Yes  61  148  71%    1  28  76  73% 

























































3  6  16  73% 
              4+  3  5  63% 
 
                               
                     
                     
White Defendants 


















No  45  86  66%    0  45  86  66% 
                 
Yes  68  180  73%    1  38  109  74% 
























































3  11  19  63% 
              4+  2  8  80% 
                                
Note: Cross tabulations are reported for the main analysis sample, which includes 333 cases with black defendants and 379 









Table 4:  Reduced Form Benchmark Regressions 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




Black Defendant  0.150***  0.164***  0.156***  0.160*** 
  [0.056]  [0.058]  [0.055]  [0.057] 
Any Black in Pool  0.069  0.105**  0.063  0.090* 
  [0.048]  [0.051]  [0.047]  [0.050] 
Black Defendant*Any Black in Pool  -0.168**  -0.166**  -0.174**  -0.155** 
  [0.070]  [0.074]  [0.069]  [0.072] 
Constant  0.656***  0.627***  0.600***  0.576*** 
  [0.039]  [0.041]  [0.038]  [0.040] 
Includes Controls for:             
Gender/Age of Pool  No  Yes  No  Yes 
County Dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Year of Filing Dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  712  712  712  712 
R-squared  0.01  0.07  0.01  0.08 
Note:  The dependent variable for each regression is shown in the row heading.  All regressions are estimated on the 
main analysis sample using OLS and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  The gender of 
the jury pool is measured as the proportion of the pool that is female, and the age of jury pool is controlled for with the 
proportion of the pool that is age 40 or less, and proportion of the pool that is between the ages of 40 and 60. For each of 
the controls (including county and year of filing dummies) both a demeaned version of the control variable and the 
interaction of this demeaned variable with whether the defendant is black are included in the specification.  Because the 
control variables are demeaned, the coefficients on the variables reported in the table can be interpreted as the estimated 
effect at the mean and are comparable across columns. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 









 Table 5:  Robustness/Sensitivity Checks 
   Dependent Variable - Any Guilty Conviction 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Black Defendant  0.164***  0.149**  0.126**  0.134***  0.163***  0.142** 
  [0.058]  [0.063]  [0.060]  [0.051]  [0.058]  [0.055] 
Any Black in Pool  0.105**  0.092*  0.098*  0.075*  0.086*  0.07 
  [0.051]  [0.053]  [0.052]  [0.045]  [0.050]  [0.048] 
Black Defendant*Any Black in Pool  -0.166**  -0.139*  -0.130*  -0.135**  -0.156**  -0.160** 
  [0.074]  [0.080]  [0.076]  [0.065]  [0.073]  [0.070] 
Constant  0.627***  0.635***  0.636***  0.697***  0.613***  0.667*** 
   [0.041]  [0.042]  [0.042]  [0.036]  [0.040]  [0.039] 
Sample Notes  Main Sample  Main Sample  Main Sample 
Includes 
Lake cases 
that are pled 










as  guilty jury 
verdict 
Benchmark Controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Defendant and Case Characteristics  No  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Judge Dummies  No  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Observations  712  710  709  845  737  737 
R-squared  0.07  0.11  0.13  0.04  0.05  0.05 
Note: All regressions are estimated using OLS.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets.  The benchmark controls are the full set of 
controls included in the specifications reported in Columns (2) and (4) in Table 4.  Defendant and case characteristics include a male indicator, as 
well as indicators for each of the various crime categories.  Each of these controls was demeaned and interacted with whether there were any 
blacks in the pool.  Judge dummies were demeaned and interacted with whether the defendant was black. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10 percent, 5 percent; and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 
 Table 6:  Heterogeneity Across Charge Category (Drugs, Violent Offenses, Property Offenses) and County 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 













Black Defendant  0.150***  0.223**  0.127**  0.244**  0.085  0.097 
  [0.056]  [0.101]  [0.063]  [0.114]  [0.097]  [0.140] 
Any Black in Pool  0.069  0.149*  0.085  0.19  0.081  -0.025 
  [0.048]  [0.084]  [0.057]  [0.128]  [0.088]  [0.108] 
Black Defendant*Any Black in 
Pool  -0.168**  -0.201*  -0.160*  -0.474***  -0.210*  0.102 
  [0.070]  [0.116]  [0.088]  [0.152]  [0.119]  [0.167] 
Constant  0.656***  0.500***  0.730***  0.650***  0.675***  0.640*** 
  [0.039]  [0.073]  [0.043]  [0.095]  [0.072]  [0.092] 
Sample  All (baseline)  Lake County  Sarasota County 
Drug charges 










Observations  712  363  349  156  267  152 
R-squared  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.09  0.02  0.03 
 
Note:  All regressions are estimated using OLS.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets.  No additional controls were included in the regressions. *, 






 Table 7:  Comparing to OLS Estimate of Effect of Racial Composition of Seated Jury on Trial Outcomes  
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Note:  All specifications include the complete set of benchmark controls described in Table 4.  Columns (1) and (4) in this table correspond to 
columns (2) and (4) of Table 4, respectively. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent; and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.      
 
 Appendix Table 1:  Summary Statistics Stratified by County 
  
Lake County      Sarasota County  
   Mean  Sd     Mean  Sd 
Defendant Characteristics           
Black Defendant  0.50  0.50    0.38  0.49 
Hispanic Defendant  0.02  0.15    0.06  0.24 
White Defendant  0.47  0.50    0.55  0.50 
Male Defendant  0.93  0.25    0.91  0.29 
 
Case Characteristics           
Total Charges  3.47  4.57    2.55  2.18 
Any Drug Charge  0.22  0.41    0.28  0.45 
Any Murder Charge  0.08  0.27    0.03  0.16 
Any Robbery Charge  0.10  0.30    0.08  0.28 
Any Other Violent Charge  0.35  0.48    0.27  0.44 
Any Property Charge  0.26  0.44    0.21  0.41 
Any Sex Charge  0.13  0.34    0.14  0.34 
Any Weapons Charge  0.16  0.37    0.08  0.28 
Any Other Charge  0.32  0.47    0.33  0.47 
 
Dependant Variables           
Proportion Guilty Convictions  0.584  0.458    0.756  0.401 
Any Guilty Convictions  0.653  0.477    0.803  0.399 
 
Pool and Seated Jury Characteristics         
Number of Seated Jurors  7.31  0.50    6.93  0.38 
Number in Jury Pool  27.0  7.4    27.6  7.2 
Any Black in Pool  0.76  0.43    0.53  0.50 
Any Black on Seated Jury  0.36  0.48    0.19  0.39 
Proportion Black on Seated Jury  0.061  0.089    0.031  0.068 
Proportion Black in Pool  0.051  0.044    0.028  0.032 
Observations  384        401    
Note – This table reports summary statistics for the full sample, (those reported in the first two columns of Table 
1), stratified by county. The first two columns of this table report summary statistics for the 384 cases in Lake 
County, while the last two columns report statistics for the 401 cases in Sarasota County. Summary statistics for the 
proportion variables (i.e., proportion guilty convictions, proportion black on seated jury, and proportion black in 




 Appendix Table 2:  The Relationship Between the Age and Gender of the Jury Pool and Defendant and 
Case Characteristics 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  
Proportion of 
Females in Pool 
Proportion of Pool 
Age 40 or Less 
Proportion of Pool 
b/w Age 40 and 
60 
Proportion of Pool 
Older than Age 60 
Defendant Characteristics       
Black Defendant  0.001  0.011  -0.002  -0.009 
  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008] 
Hispanic Defendant  0.025  -0.016  -0.011  0.028 
  [0.016]  [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.021] 
Male Defendant  -0.002  0.025**  -0.007  -0.018 
  [0.012]  [0.011]  [0.014]  [0.014] 
Case Characteristics         
Any Drug Charge  0.014  -0.015  0.006  0.008 
  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.010] 
Any Murder Charge  0.013  0.004  -0.011  0.007 
  [0.014]  [0.013]  [0.014]  [0.014] 
Any Other Charge  0.002  -0.005  0.01  -0.005 
  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008] 
Any Other Violent Charge  0.012  -0.002  -0.004  0.007 
  [0.009]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008] 
Any Property Charge  0.007  0.004  -0.007  0.003 
  [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.010]  [0.010] 
Any Robbery Charge  -0.002  -0.011  -0.009  0.02 
  [0.014]  [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.013] 
Any Sex Charge  0.02  -0.011  -0.006  0.017 
  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012] 
Any Weapons Charge  0.005  0.001  -0.003  0.002 
  [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.012]  [0.011] 
Total Charges  -0.0003  0.002*  -0.002**  -0.0001 
  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Constant  0.496***  0.221***  0.497***  0.282*** 
  [0.013]  [0.012]  [0.015]  [0.015] 
Observations  771  771  771  771 
F-Statistic  0.78  1.43  1.24  0.76 
R-squared  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Note:   The regressions results reported in this table are exactly analogous to those shown in Table 2 estimated for the 
dependent variables shown in the column heading that characterize the age and gender of the jury pool. As in Table 2, F-
statistics jointly testing whether all coefficients equal zero are shown in the table and *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent; and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
  
Appendix Table 3:  Comparison of Defendant and Case Characteristics for Any Black versus No Black 
Pools 
   Any Blacks in Pool     No Blacks in Pool    





Defendant Characteristics             
Black Defendant  0.431  0.022    0.450  0.030    0.612 
Hispanic Defendant  0.043  0.009    0.043  0.012    0.979 
Male Defendant  0.924  0.012    0.908  0.017    0.420 
 
Case Characteristics               
Any Drug Charge  0.233  0.019    0.287  0.027    0.096 
Any Murder Charge  0.059  0.011    0.039  0.012    0.222 
Any Other Charge  0.325  0.021    0.330  0.028    0.895 
Any Other Violent Charge  0.305  0.021    0.309  0.028    0.912 
Any Property Charge  0.256  0.020    0.199  0.024    0.072 
Any Robbery Charge  0.088  0.013    0.096  0.018    0.717 
Any Sex Charge  0.143  0.016    0.113  0.019    0.242 
Any Weapons Charge  0.131  0.015    0.099  0.018    0.193 
Total Charges  3.188  0.187    2.663  0.134    0.049 
Observations  489        282          
Note:  This table reports means and standard deviations of defendant and case characteristics stratified by whether there 
were any black potential jurors in the jury pool.  Statistics are reported for the sample (N=771) of cases for which a jury 
was selected and all defendant and case characteristics are observed.  Relative to the full sample summarized in the first 
two columns of Table 1, fourteen observations were lost because they had missing values for one or more of the defendant 
and case characteristics.   
 
 